Produced by Andrea Ball, Eric Eldred, Charles Franks,
AFGHANISTAN
AND THE
ANGLO-RUSSIAN DISPUTE
AN ACCOUNT OF RUSSIA'S ADVANCE TOWARD INDIA, BASED UPON THE
REPORTS AND EXPERIENCES OF RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AND BRITISH
OFFICERS AND TRAVELLERS; WITH A DESCRIPTION OF
AFGHANISTAN AND OF THE MILITARY RESOURCES
OF THE POWERS CONCERNED
BY
THEO. F. RODENBOUGH
BVT. BRIGADIER GENERAL, U.S.A.
* * * * *
WITH THREE MAPS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS
* * * * *
CONTENTS
I.
THROUGH THE GATES OF ASIA
II.
ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDIA
III.
THE BRITISH FORCES AND ROUTES
IV.
THE RUSSIAN FORCES AND APPROACHES
V.
REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
INDEX
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
MAPS.
Afghanistan and the Surrounding Territories (Drawn for this Work and
Corrected by the Latest Military Surveys--end of vol.)
[Note: It was not possible to include this map as the original was
too fragile to scan.]
The Asiatic Territories Absorbed by Russia During the Past Two
Centuries, with the Dates of the Various Annexations
The Russian Lines of Advance from their Base of Supplies
CUTS.
Abdurrahman Khan, Ameer of Kabul (Frontispiece)
Mahaz Khan (A Tajik), Khan of Pest Bolak
Jehandad (Lohanir), from Ghazni
Wullie Mohammed, a Dahzungi Hazara
Pozai Khan, a Shinwarri (Musician)
Khan Baz, a Khumbhur Khel Afreedi
Tooro Baz, a Kookie Khel Afreedi
Zool Kuddar, an Adam Khel Afreedi
Mousa, a Kizilbash, Born in Peshawur
The City of Kandahar, Afghanistan
Castle of Zohâk, First March from Bamian, Irâk Road to Kabul
An Afghan Post-Chaise; Going to the Front
Gate of the Bazaar at Kabul
Major-General, Sir F. S. Roberts, V.C., K.C.B.
Khelat-i-Ghilzi, between Kandahar and Ghazni
Elephant with Artillery; on the Road to Ali Musjid
Detail of Elephant Saddle
Noah's Valley, Kunar River
Watch Tower in the Khaiber Pass
Fort of Ali Musjid, from the Heights above Lala Cheena, in the
Khaiber Pass
Fort of Dakka, on the Kabul River
The Ishbola Tepé, Khaiber Pass
Entrance to the Bolan Pass, from Dadur
Entrance to the Khojak Pass, from Pishin, on the Road to Kandahar
The Order of March in Central Asia
Gorge in the Tirband-i-Turkestan, through which the Murghab flows
Jelalabad, from Piper's Hill
AFGHANISTAN AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN DISPUTE
I.
THROUGH THE GATES OF ASIA.
In universal history there is no more interesting subject for the
consideration of the political student than the record of Russian
progress through Central Asia.
In one sense this advance is a practical reestablishment or
extension of the influence of the Aryan race in countries long
dominated by peoples of Turki or Mongolian origin; in another
sense it has resulted in a transition from the barbarism or rude
forms of Asiatic life to the enlightenment and higher moral
development of a European age. In a religious sense it embodies a
crusade against Oriental fanaticism; and it is a curious feature of
the Anglo-Russian dispute, that upon a question of temporal gain,
the greatest Christian nation finds itself allied with the followers
of Buddha and Mahomet against Russia under the Banner of the Cross.
The descendants of the great Peter have opened up in Central Asia a
new region which, if as yet it has not been "made to blossom as the
rose," has nevertheless profited by the introduction of law, order,
and a certain amount of industrial prosperity.
Russia commenced her relations with Central Asia as early as the
sixteenth century. Not only through embassies sent, but by military
expeditions; these, however, at that time were private ventures by
roving Cossacks and other inhabitants of Southern Russia. Authorized
government expeditions commenced with Peter the Great, who in
1716-17 sent two exploring parties into the Central Asian deserts--
Bekovitch to Khiva, and Likhareff to the Black Irtish. These
expeditions were undertaken in search of gold, supposed to exist in
those regions, but failed in their object; the detachment under
Bekovitch being entirely destroyed after reaching Khiva. Peter
next turned his attention to the country bordering upon the
southern shores of the Caspian Sea; taking advantage of Persian
embarrassments, with the consent of the Shah and of the Sultan he
acquired, in 1722-3, the provinces of Gilan, Mazanderan, and
Asterabad; but the great expense of maintaining a large garrison so
remote from Russia, and the unhealthiness of the locality, induced
the Russian Government, in 1732, to restore the districts to Persia.
In the same year Abul-Khair, the Khan of the Little Kirghiz Horde,
voluntarily submitted to Russia. Twenty years later a small strip of
the kingdom of Djungaria, on the Irtish, was absorbed, and toward
the commencement of the reign of Catharine II., Russian authority
was asserted and maintained over the broad tract from the Altai to
the Caspian. This occupation was limited to a line of outposts along
the Ural, the Irtish, and in the intervening district. During
Catharine's reign the frontier nomads became reduced in numbers, by
the departure from the steppe between the Ural and Volga of the
Calmucks, who fled into Djungaria, and were nearly destroyed on the
road, by the Kirghiz.
The connection between Russia and Central Asia at this time assumed
another character, that of complete tranquillity, in consequence of
the development of trade through Orenburg and to some extent through
Troitsk and Petropaulovsk. The lines along the Ural and Irtish
gradually acquired strength; the robber-raids into European Russia
and Western Siberia almost entirely ceasing. The allegiance of the
Kirghiz of the Little and Central Hordes was expressed in the fact
that their Khans were always selected under Russian influence and
from time to time appeared at St. Petersburg to render homage. With
the Central Asian khanates there was no connection except that of
trade, but as regarded the Turcomans, who, it is said, had
frequently asked for Russian protection, intercourse was
discouraged, as they could not be trusted "within the lines," being
simply bandits.
The Emperor Paul imagined that the steppes offered a good road to
Southern Asia, and desiring to expel the English from India, in the
year 1800 he despatched a large number of Don Cossacks, under
Orloff, through the districts of the Little Horde. At the time a
treaty was concluded with Napoleon, then First Consul, by virtue of
which a combined Russo-French army was to disembark at Asterabad and
march from thence into India by way of Khorassan and Afghanistan.
The death of the Emperor of Russia put an end to this plan.
During the reign of Alexander I., Central Asia was suffered to rest,
and even the Chinese made raids into Russian territory without
interruption. In the third decade of the present century, however,
several advanced military settlements of Cossacks were founded.
"Thus," says M. Veniukoff, "was inaugurated the policy which
afterward guided us in the steppe, the foundation of advanced
settlements and towns (at first forts, afterwards stanitsas
[Footnote: Cossack settlements.]) until the most advanced of them
touches some natural barrier."
About 1840, it was discovered that the system of military
colonization was more effectual in preserving order in the Orenburg
district than by flying detachments sent, as occasion required, from
Southern Russia; and in 1845-6 the Orenburg and Ural (or Targai and
Irgiz) forts were established. In 1846 the Great Kirghiz Horde
acknowledged its subjection to Russia on the farther side of the
Balkash, while at the same time a fort was constructed on the lower
Yaxartes.
In 1847 the encroachments of Russia in Central Asia had brought her
upon the borders of the important khanates of Khiva and Khokand,
and, like some huge boa-constrictor, she prepared to swallow them.
In 1852 the inevitable military expedition was followed by the
customary permanent post. Another row of forts was planted on the
Lower Yaxartes, and in 1854 far to the eastward, in the midst of the
Great Horde, was built Fort Vernoye--the foundation of a new line,
more or less contiguous to natural boundaries (mountains and
rivers), but not a close line. Between Perovsky and Vernoye there
were upwards of four hundred and fifty miles of desert open to the
incursions of brigands, and between the Aral and Caspian seas there
was a gap, two hundred miles in width, favorable for raids into the
Orenburg Steppe from the side of Khiva. Finally, under the pretext
of closing this gap, a general convergent movement of the Siberian
and Orenburg forces commenced, culminating under General Tchernayeff
in the capture of Aulieata and Chemkent in 1864, and of Tashkent in
1865.
Here, M. Veniukoff says: "The Government intended to halt in its
conquests, and, limiting itself to forming a closed line on the
south of the Kirghiz steppes, left it to the sedentary inhabitants
of Tashkent to form a separate khanate from the Khokand so hostile
to us." And this historian tells us that the Tashkendees declined
the honor of becoming the Czar's policemen in this way, evidently
foreseeing the end, and, to cut the matter short, chose the Russian
general, Tchernayeff, as their Khan. The few Central Asian rulers
whose necks had so far escaped the Muscovite heel, made an
ineffectual resistance, and in 1866 Hodjeni and Jizakh were duly
"annexed," thus separating Bokhara and Khokand.
Here we may glance at the method by which Russia took firmer root on
the shores of the Caspian, and established a commercial link with
the Khivan region. In 1869 a military post and seaport was planted
at Krasnovodsk, on that point of the east shore of the Caspian,
which presents the greatest facilities for shipping, and as a base
of operations against the Turcomans, who were at that time very
troublesome. Several military expeditions set out from this point,
and every year detachments of troops were despatched to keep the
roads open toward Khiva, the Kepet Dagh, or the banks of the Attrek.
Within five years (1870-'75) the nomads living within the routes
named had become "good Turcomans," carried the Czar's mails to
Khiva, and furnished the Krasnovodsk-Khivan caravans with camels and
drivers. But the colonization scheme on the lower Caspian had once
more brought the Russians to the Persian boundary. In 1869 the Shah
had been rather officiously assured that Russia would not think of
going below the line of the Attrek; yet, as Colonel Veniukoff shows,
she now regrets having committed herself, and urges "geographical
ignorance" of the locality when the assurance was given, and the
fact that part of her restless subjects, on the Attrek, pass eight
months of the year in Russian territory and four in "so-called"
Persia; it is therefore not difficult to imagine the probable change
on the map of that quarter.
The march continued toward Khiva, and after the usual iron-hand-in-
velvet-glove introduction, General Kaufmann in 1873 pounced upon
that important khanate, and thus added another to the jewels of the
Empire. Nominally, Khiva is independent, but nevertheless collects
and pays to Russia a considerable contribution annually.
In 1868 Russia seized Samarcand, and established over the khanate of
Bokhara a similar supervision to that in Khiva. As the distinguished
Russian already quoted remarks: "The programme of the political
existence of Bokhara as a separate sovereignty was accorded to her
by us in the shape of two treaties, in 1868 and 1873, which defined
her subordinate relation to Russia. But no one looks at these acts
as the treaties of an equal with an equal. They are instructions in
a polite form, or programmes given by the civilized conqueror to the
conquered barbarians, and the execution of which is guaranteed by
the immediate presence of a military force."
The district of Khokand, whose ruler, Khudoyar Khan, submitted
himself to Russia in 1867, was for a number of years nominally
independent, but becoming disturbed by domestic dissensions, was
ultimately annexed under the name of the Fergana Province.
To this point we have followed Colonel Veniukoff's account of the
Russian advance. It will doubtless interest the reader to continue
the narrative from an English view, exceptionally accurate and
dispassionate in its nature.
In a lecture before the Royal United Service Institution in London,
May 16, 1884, Lieut.-General Sir Edward Hamley, of the British Army,
discussed the Central Asian question before an audience comprising
such Indian experts as Sir Henry Rawlinson, Lord Napier of Magdala,
and Mr. Charles Marvin, and many distinguished officers, including
Lord Chelmsford, Sir F. Haines, and Colonel Malleson. Among other
things, General Hamley said:
"Probably England has never been quite free, during the present
century, from some degree of anxiety caused by the steady, gradual
approaches of Russia through Central Asia toward India. It was seen
that where her foot was planted it never went back. It was seen that
with forces comparatively small she never failed to effect any
conquest she was bent on, and that the conquest, once effected, was
final. This security in possession was owing in great measure to the
fact that the governments she displaced were bad governments, and
that she substituted one far better in itself and of a simplicity
which was well adapted to the people with whom she was dealing. She
aimed mainly at three things--the establishment of order and of
confidence and the obtaining of some return for her own heavy
expenses. From the establishment of order and of confidence sprang a
prosperity which enabled her to obtain a certain revenue, though
entirely inadequate to her expenditure. Thus we beheld her pressing
solidly on, and we knew not where she might stop. Pretexts, such as
it was difficult to find a flaw in, were never wanting on which to
ground a fresh absorption of territory. And seeing behind this
advance a vast country--almost a continent--which was not merely a
great Asiatic Power, but a great European State, under autocratic,
irresponsible rule, with interests touching ours at many points, it
is not to be wondered at that we watched with anxiety her progress
as she bore steadily down toward our Indian frontier."
General Hamley says that England became particularly suspicious of
Russia in 1867 when she absorbed Turkestan, and this feeling was
intensified in 1878, while the Treaty of Berlin was still pending.
General Kaufmann assembled a small army of about 12,000 men and
thirty-two guns on the frontier of Bokhara, and although upon the
signing of the treaty all threatening movements ceased, yet the
British commander then operating in Afghanistan knew that Kaufmann
had proposed to march in the direction of Kabul, and menace the
British frontier.
It has ever been the practice of Russia, in her schemes of
aggrandizement, to combine her diplomatic with her military
machinery; but, unlike other nations, the ambassador has generally
been subordinate to the general.
At the time that General Kaufmann sheathed his sword under the
influence of the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, there remained another
representative of Russia--General Stolietoff--who had been quietly
negotiating with the Ameer of Afghanistan, Shere Ali, the terms of a
"Russian treaty," whose characteristics have already been described.
Hearing of this, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg questioned
the Russian Minister, who answered him "that no mission had been,
nor was intended to be, sent to Kabul, either by the Imperial
Government or by General Kaufmann." This denial was given on July
3d, the day after Stolietoff and his mission had started from
Samarcand. After the envoy's arrival at Kabul, another remonstrance
met with the reply that the mission was "of a professional nature
and one of simple courtesy," and was not, therefore, inconsistent
with the pacific assurances already given. The real nature of this
mission became known from papers found by General Roberts at Kabul
in 1879. These showed that Shere Ali had been invited to form a
close alliance with the Russian Government. General Kaufmann had
advised Shere Ali to try and stir up disaffection among the Queen's
Indian subjects, promising to aid him, eventually, with troops.
Finding that this scheme was impracticable at the moment, Russia
dropped the Ameer, who fled from the scene of his misfortunes, and
died soon after.
For the moment England breathed more freely. There were still great
natural obstacles between the empires of Russia and of India. Not
only the friendly state of Afghanistan, but on its northwestern
border the neutral territory of Merv, hitherto an independent
province, and inhabited by warlike tribes of Turcomans difficult to
reach through their deserts and likely to harass a Russian advance
to Herat to an embarrassing extent. It was seen that the possession
of this territory would at once free Russia from much difficulty in
case of an advance and give her the means of threatening Herat as
well as Kabul from her base in Turkestan, and even to some extent to
carry forward that base beyond the Oxus.
On the part of Russia, the success of General Skobeleff in capturing
the fortified position of Geok Tepé, January 24, 1880, marked the
beginning of negotiations with the Turcomans for the acquisition of
Merv. For a long while these were unsuccessful, but early in 1884 it
was cabled to London, that "The Queen of the World" had accepted the
White Czar as her future liege lord.
The immediate cause of this event was the effect produced upon the
minds of the Turcoman deputation to Moscow by the spectacle of the
Czar's coronation. The impression created by the gorgeous ceremonial
was heightened by the presence of so many Asiatic chiefs and
kinglets at the ancient and historic capital of Russia. The tales
they brought back were well calculated to influence the minds of a
wild and primitive people; and when the Khan of Khiva proffered his
services for the settlement of their relations with Russia, that
section of the Tekke tribe in favor of peace accepted them. The
chiefs tendered their formal submission to the Czar, and promised to
allow Russian merchants to reside among them, and pledged themselves
to maintain the security of the routes from the Oxus to the Tejend;
also accepting the responsibilities of Russian subjects by rendering
tribute either in money or by military service. To all intents and
purposes it is equivalent to the establishment of a Russian garrison
in Merv.
The thorough way in which Russia seeks to bind her Asiatic subjects
is shown in the fact that in 1884, at the request of the Khan of
Khiva, a Russian tutor was selected to instruct his children.
Soon after it was reported that the Russians had established
themselves at Sarakhs on the direct road to Herat and just over the
Persian boundary of Afghanistan. These later movements again aroused
the distrust of England, and a joint commission of Russian and
English officials was appointed early in the year 1885.
While the English members of the commission under Sir Peter Lumsden
were awaiting the convenience of their foreign colleagues, the
presence of Russian troops was reported on the disputed territory in
the vicinity of Herat.
This action alarmed the Afghans, and a collision seemed imminent.
The English Government considered M. de Giers' explanation of this
encroachment unsatisfactory. Pending an adjustment of the new
complication both nations prepared for the worst.
Here we will leave the subject of the Russian advance through the
Gates of Asia and pass to the consideration of the present neutral
ground of Afghanistan.
II.
ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDIA.
From the Amu Daria and the Turcoman steppes to the deserts of
Beloochistan, from Persian Khorassan to the valley of the Indus,
stretches the country of the Afghans. Men of renown and events of
world-wide interest have been connected with its history. Its
records tell of the murder of Cavagnari in recent times; of the
tragedy of Elphinstone's command (1838-42); of Shah Nadir, the
butcher of Delhi (1738-39); of Baber Khan, the founder of Mongolian
rule in India (1520); of Timur, the assailer of the world (1398); of
Genghiz Khan, the annihilator of the civilization of ancient Asia
(1218-24); of the great ruler, Sultan Mahmoud (A. D. 1000); and yet
earlier, of Alexander, "the divinely favored Macedonian." Afghan
history dies away, in the hymns of the Indian Vedas, eighteen
hundred years before the birth of Christ.
The territory of Afghanistan--which is destined to be the arena of a
great international duel--covers an area of 12,000 square miles, or
a tract measuring from north to south 688 miles, and from east to
west 736 miles. It is a mountainous country; a high plateau, 6,000
feet above the sea, overlooked by lofty mountain ranges which open
out and sink toward the west and south. On the north it is bordered
by the western ranges of the Himalayas, which reach to the Amu
Daria; by the wall-like range of the Hindu Kush, some of whose peaks
are 19,000 feet high; and by several smaller ridges. Between the
Kabul and Kuram rivers rises the snow-capped Sufeid Koh, the
principal peak of which, to the south of Jelalabad, attains an
altitude of 15,000 feet. To the south of this, in Southern
Afghanistan, the Suleiman range, of an average height of 9,000 feet,
falls rapidly toward the valley of the Indus. Between the Hindu Kush
and the Suleiman ranges there are several lesser ones stretching
toward the southwest, including the Auran Mountains (7,000 feet).
Of the principal rivers noted here (the Helmund, Har-i-Rúd, Kabul,
Kuram, and the Gomal) the Helmund alone is navigable. The Helmund
terminates in the swamps of Seistan, as also do the Kash, Farrah,
and Herat rivers, running parallel to the Helmund across the
Kandahar-Herat roads, at 80, 150, and 200 miles, respectively, to
the west of it. These rivers are without bridges, but (with the
exception of the Helmund--provided with ferry at Girishk) are
fordable, save in the months of April and May. The country is
otherwise open and easily traversable, but only on the main routes
can water be readily obtained, and forage is scarce in the winter.
The Turnuk valley, running northeast from Kandahar, is followed by
the great route to Ghazni and Kabul skirting the Guikok range--
separated from the Hazaristan to its west by the parallel valley of
the Argandab. The latter valley is also followed by a route which
enters it from Mooktur, the source of the Turnuk. This debouches
upon the Herat road about ten miles west of Kandahar, and there is
no communication west of it between Herat and Kabul, save by
impracticable mountain routes across the Hazaristan.
Three routes from Kandahar to Herat separate at Girishk on the
Helmund, cross the Kash at different points, and meet at Sabzawar
(280 miles from Kandahar) on the Herat; both of the southernmost
passing by the town of Farrah, which is 230 miles from Kandahar.
From Girishk also a road follows the Helmund to Seistan and Lash
Jowain, where it joins the Herat road at Farrah on the river of that
name, or at Sabzawar on the Herat. The southernmost of the routes to
Farrah also branches from Kash down the river named Kash, joining
the Seistan route at Lash.
The general aspect of Afghanistan is that of a series of elevated
flat-bottomed valleys, in the vicinity of the streams, somewhat
under cultivation. The scenery is often wild and beautiful, and some
of the defiles to the north of the Hindu Kush are said to be of
appalling grandeur, while the soft, still loveliness of the
sheltered glens on the southern slope of that range strongly
impresses the traveller who visits them. Some of the ranges in the
north and northeast are well timbered with pine and oak.
The eastern half of Afghanistan is generally cold and rugged, but
sustains innumerable flocks and herds, and abounds in mineral
wealth, especially lead and sulphur. In the more sheltered valleys
considerable fruit is grown, but only grain enough for the actual
consumption of the inhabitants. Water and fodder abound, but fuel is
deficient; a serious matter, as the cold in the winter is extreme.
The western part of Afghanistan is a more fertile region,
interspersed, it is true, with lofty ranges, but comprising many
pleasant valleys and pastures.
The population is approximately estimated at eight millions.
Afghanistan is a genuine society of different nations, although the
greater part are of Persian descent. The strongholds of the German
self-protecting federations are here produced on a large scale.
Thus the Duranis, Tajiks, Yusafzais, Ghilzais, Eimâks, Hazaris,
Kaffirs, Hindus, Jats, Arabs, Kizilbashis, Uzbeks, Biluchis, are
near neighbors; of these about 3,000,000 may be real Afghans who
profess the Suni faith and speak Indo-Persian Puchtu. There are over
four hundred inferior tribes known. The Duranis are numerically
strongest and live in the vicinity of Kandahar. Next in importance
are the Ghilzais, estimated at 30,000 fighting men living in the
triangle--Kabul, Jelalabad, Khelat-i-Ghilzai; until 1747 they
furnished the rulers of Afghanistan. To the south of the Ghilzais
live the Puchtu-speaking races who chiefly defend only their own
territory; the mountainous eastern border is inhabited by the
Momunds, Afridis, Arakzais, Zymukts, Waziris, who have never been
subdued. Their sense of independence, however, does not prevent them
from selling their friendship for ready money to the highest bidder.
On the watershed of the Helmund and Indus dwell the independent
Pathans and Biluchis. The Persian-speaking Kizilbashis in Kabul,
comprise 3,000,000 of Shiahs, who are not Afghans, many of whose
30,000 fighting men are in the Ameer's regular army. The Tajiks--
about 10,000 men--are chiefly in the Kabul and Ghazni districts.
The Hazaris and Eimâks are in the central section of Afghanistan,
known as the Hazaristan, extending east and west from the Koushan
pass over the Hindu-Kush range to Marchat on the Turcoman frontier,
and north and south from Sirpool in Turkestan to Girishk, between
Kandahar and Herat; they are the descendants of the military
settlers left by the Tartar hordes that swept Central Asia under
Genghiz Khan, and still maintain a quasi-independence; they
cordially detest the Afghan Government, but pay an annual tribute in
money to its support. Finally there is a million of foreign
nationalities, including Turks, Persians, Indians, Armenians, and
Kaffirs; the last-named are Hindus, and violent antagonists of the
Mohammedans living around them.
Thus it is seen that modern Afghanistan comprises three great
districts--Herat in the west, Kabul in the east, and Kandahar in the
centre, with the seat of government at the cities of the same names
respectively. Within each district are, as already described, a
large number of tribes occupying sub-districts, closely connected
like the cells of a honey-comb, but each with its destinctive
manners and customs and irregular military forces, in no instance
numbering less than 6,000 men, and often twice that number, divided
about equally into horse and foot. Many of these render military
service to the Ameer, many are bandits in the worst sense. The
nomadic tribes--like the Eimâks peopling the Heratic region--live
principally in tents, encamping in winter in the valleys, and in
summer on the table-lands of the mountain ranges. They are ignorant,
hospitable, and brave and ardent hunters. Their principal trade is
with Herat, and consists of woollen and camel-hair fabrics and
clarified butter.
The farming population all live in small hamlets. The better classes
of these live in villages surrounding or joined to the castle of a
Khan. These castles are encompassed by a rude wall, having
frequently turrets at the corners, and occasionally armed with
swivel-guns or wall-pieces. The principal gardens are always on the
outside of the castle, and the herds of horses and camels belonging
to the Khan are kept at distant pastures and attended by herders,
who live in tents. In the Bori and Ghazgar valleys the houses are of
wood. In the Ghazgar valley they are all fortified, as already
described; the doors are generally mere man-holes, and the top of
the towers are loopholes. The better class, and more modern of
these, have flat roofs, from which the water is carried by spouts;
the walls surrounding are at least twelve feet high, and cover
nearly an acre of ground. Three or four such houses usually
constitute a village. These semi-barbarians are noted for the length
and ferocity of their feuds. Sometimes two branches of a family who
are neighbors become enemies. The distance between their "fortlets"
may be two hundred yards, and on that space no one ventures. They go
out at opposite gates and walk straight from their own fort in a
line protected by its walls from the fire of the other, until out of
range, then they turn around to their fields. Broadfoot relates that
"once in Zurmat I saw a fort shut by rolling a stone against the
door, instead of with the usual heavy chain. On inquiring as to the
cause of such carelessness, the Malik, a fine old man with a plump,
good-humored face, stretched his arms out toward the line of distant
forts, and said: 'I have not an enemy!' It was a pleasing exception
to the rule."
These feuds are a system of petty warfare, carried on by long shots,
stealing cattle, and burning crops. Samson, burning his neighbor's
corn, acted just like an Afghan. When the harvest is nearly ripe,
neither party dare sleep. The remedy is sometimes for both to fight
until an equal number are killed on each side, when the neighbors
step in and effect a reconciliation; another method is to pay
forfeit of a feast and some sheep or cloth; in exceptional cases, a
few Afghan virgins are substituted for the sheep, but they are given
in marriage, and are well treated.
Our space does not permit an extended reference to the manners and
customs of this primitive people but a few characteristics may be
briefly noted. The love of war is felt much more among Afghans than
by other Eastern peoples, although but little effort has been made
by them to augment the means of resistance and aggression. Pillage,
fighting, and disturbances are at times necessary to their very
existence, and are followed by long days of idleness, during which
they live on the fruits of their depredations. There is no shade of
difference between the character of the nomad and the citizen; a
town life does not soften their habits; they live there as they live
in a tent, armed to the teeth and ready for the onslaught. Though
full of duplicity, one is nevertheless liable to be taken in by
their apparent frankness. They are hospitable to strangers, but only
because this is an ancient custom which has the force of law and is
not a virtue which springs from the heart. The pride of the Afghans
is a marked feature of their national character. They boast of their
descent, their prowess in arms, their independence; and cap all by
"Am I not a Puktan?"
The Afghan people, occupied with the defence of their homes, have
failed to assist the Ameer in the formation and maintenance of that
indispensable instrument--an organized, well-equipped, easily
mobilized army. In regular battle the Afghans can have but little
hope of success; their strength lies in the petty warfare peculiar
to a wild, mountainous country. As auxiliaries, as partisan troops
in their own country, they would be of great value to their allies
and extremely troublesome to their enemies. For outpost, courier,
and scouting purposes, they would doubtless be most efficient. The
strength of the organized army in the service of the Ameer of
Afghanistan is about 50,000 men of all arms. The traveller Vámbéry,
who visited Herat in 1863, says:
"The Afghan's national costume consists of a long shirt, drawers,
and dirty linen clothes; or, if he is a soldier, he affects a
British red coat. He throws it over his shirt, while he gets on his
head the picturesque Indo-Afghan turban. Others again--and these are
the beau-monde--are wont to assume a half-Persian costume.
Weapons are borne by all. Rarely does any one, whether civil or
military, enter the bazar without his sword and shield. To be
quite ŕ la mode one must carry about one quite an arsenal,
consisting of two pistols, a sword, poniard, hand-jar, gun, and
shield." M. Vámbéry also describes a drill of some Afghan regulars.
"The men had a very military bearing, far better than the Ottoman
army that was so drilled forty years ago. These might have been
mistaken for European troops if most of them had not had on their
bare feet the pointed Kabuli shoe, and had not had their short
trowsers so tightly stretched by their straps that they threatened
every moment to burst and fly up above the knee."
The adventurous O'Donovan thus describes an Afghan cavalryman whom
he met unexpectedly, near Herat, in 1880: "He wore a dark-colored
turban, one end of the cloth pulled up in front so as to resemble a
small cockade. His uniform was blue-black, and he wore long boots. A
broad black leather cross-belt, with two very large brass buckles,
crossed his breast. He had sabre, pistols, and carbine."
The actual fighting strength of the army of Afghanistan cannot be
definitely stated. Major Lumsden, who has represented the British
Government in that country in various diplomatic capacities, stated
(some years since) that the regular army of the Ameer consisted of
sixteen regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and seventy-six
field guns. The infantry regiments numbered about 800 men each; the
men were obtained by compulsory levy. Their uniform consisted of
English cast-off clothes purchased at auction. The pay, about five
rupees per mensem, was paid irregularly and often in kind; two
months' pay was deducted for clothing. The cavalry and artillery
were badly horsed; and the horses were sent to graze in summer. A
Russian report of 1868 estimates the infantry at 10,000 men. The
armament, equipment, and instruction of the troops have doubtless
improved since that time, as ten years later the British Government
supplied the Afghan Government with 10,000 Enfield and 5,000 Snider
rifles and one field battery, and very recently (1885) it was
announced that a present of Martini-Henry rifles and improved field
guns had been sent to Abdurrahman by the Indian authorities.
Besides the regular army there is a paid irregular mounted force of
about 20,000 men, active and formidable in "hill operations," and
known as Jezailchis.
The late General Colin Mackenzie, in an account of his experiences
in the Elphinstone disaster of 1842, says:
"The Jezailchis are so called from their jezails or long rifles. The
Afghans are said to be among the best marksmen in the world. They
are accustomed to arms from early boyhood, live in a chronic state
of warfare with their neighbors, and are most skilful in taking
advantage of cover. An Afghan will throw himself flat, behind a
stone barely big enough to cover his head, and scoop a hollow in the
ground with his left elbow as he loads. Men like these only require
training to make first-rate irregular troops.
"As a trait of Afghan character, I must mention that whenever the
Jezailchis could snatch five minutes to refresh themselves with a
pipe, one of them would twang a sort of a rude guitar as an
accompaniment to some martial song, which, mingling with the notes
of war, sounded very strangely."
The Russian General Staff have also estimated the Ameer's force,
exclusive of the irregulars, at 66,400 men with 30 guns.
The efficiency of this body, by reason of their peculiar
surroundings, must vary with the character of the operations. For
defence--particularly of their own section--they form an important
consideration; for aggressive purposes their strength lies in
partisan operations, in small detachments, requiring great mobility.
Just as it is difficult to understand the rapidity with which
large numbers are assembled in Afghanistan for fighting purposes,
so the dispersing of an Afghan army together with its attendant
masses of tribal levies in flight is almost beyond comprehension;
men who have been actually engaged in hand-to-hand combat dispose of
their arms in the villages they pass through, and meet their
pursuers with melons or other fruit in their hands, While they adopt
the rôle of peaceful inhabitants.
A brief description of some of the more noted cities of Afghanistan
may be appropriate here.
Sir Henry Rawlinson gives the following details respecting the
so-called Key of India--the city of Herat:
"That which distinguishes Herat from all other Oriental cities, and
at the same time constitutes its main defence, is the stupendous
character of the earthwork upon which the city wall is built. This
earthwork averages 250 feet in width at the base and about 50 feet
in height, and as it is crowned by a wall 25 feet high and 14 feet
thick at the base, supported by about 150 semicircular towers, and
is further protected by a ditch 45 feet in width and 16 feet in
depth, it presents an appearance of imposing strength. Whether the
place is really as strong as it looks has been differently
estimated. General Ferrier, who resided for some time in Herat, in
1846, states that the city is nothing more than an immense redoubt,
and gives it as his opinion that, as the line of wall is entirely
without flanking defences, the place could not hold out for twenty
days against a European army; and M. Khanikoff, who, although not a
professional soldier, was a very acute observer, further remarks
that the whole interior of the city is dominated from the rising
ground 700 yards distant and covered with solid buildings at the
northeast angle, while the water supply both for the ditch and the
city would be at the mercy of an enemy holding the outside country;
the wells and reservoirs inside the wall, which could then alone be
available--being quite inadequate to the wants of the inhabitants:
but on the other hand, all experience testifies to the defensibility
of the position.
"Not to speak of the siege which Herat sustained at the hands of
Genghiz Khan, of Timur, and of Ahmed Shah, we have only to remember
that in 1837 the Afghans of Herat, under Major Eldred Pottinger,
beat off the continuous attacks, for nearly ten months, of a Persian
army of 35,000 regular troops supported by fifty pieces of
artillery, and in many cases directed and even commanded by Russian
officers. The truth seems to be that Herat, although in its present
state quite unfit to resist a European army, possesses great
capabilities of defence, and might by a skilful adaptation of the
resources of modern science be made almost impregnable. Major
Saunders, a British engineer officer, calculated in 1840 that, at an
outlay of Ł60,000, which would include the expenses of deepening the
ditch, clearing the glacis and esplanade, providing flanking
defences, and repairing the walls throughout, Herat might be
rendered secure against any possible renewal of the attack by
Persia."
The location of this city upon the principal thoroughfare between
India, Persia, and Turkestan gives it a special importance in a
military sense. It is also the principal mart of Western
Afghanistan, and comprises extensive manufactures in wool and
leather. The natural fertility of the country near Herat has been
enhanced by irrigation.
"The valley, or júlgah (as the Persians say), in which the
city lies is rich in the possession of a river. This valley is about
thirty miles long by sixteen in breadth, exclusive of the ground
taken up by the fortress and the walls. Four of these miles separate
the town from the northern and twelve from the southern hills, while
at one quarter of the greater distance runs the Her-i-Rúd or Herat
River, which, rising near the Kuh-i-Baba, pursues a westerly course
till, passing the city, it sweeps, first gradually, then decidedly,
to the north, eventually to lose its identity in the environs of
Sarakhs. It is of political as well as of geographical importance,
for it passes between the Persian and Afghan frontier posts of
Kahriz and Kúsún respectively, and may be considered to mark the
Perso-Afghan boundary at the Western Paropismus. The Plain, south of
the walls, is watered by a net-work of eight or nine large and many
minor ditches. The aqueducts are stated to be superior to those of
Bokhara, Samarcand, and Ispahan. The grain produced is abundant--
beyond the requirements of town and suburbs together. The bread, the
water, and the vines have the merit of special excellence. Yet, with
all this wealth of means and material, capable of subsisting an army
of 150,000 men for some time, much of the legacy of past ages is
disregarded and nullified by the supineness of a present generation.
The ruins visible on all sides are not all useless or obsolete
works. As one conclusive instance may be cited the neglected
'Púl-i-Malan.' This bridge, of twenty-three arches, can scarcely be
considered void of purpose or practical benefit. It is, however,
rapidly falling into decay, and as the river has changed its bed,
part of it remains, barren of object, on dry land. On the rising of
the waters this state of things is inconvenient; for the river, at
such time, is no longer fordable, and the Kandahar caravans, going
to and fro, have difficulty in crossing." [Footnote: Sir F. J.
Goldsmid, "Journeys Between Herat and Khiva."]
In 1830 Conolly was of opinion that the city was one of the dirtiest
in the world, being absolutely destitute of drainage; and Vámbéry,
thirty-three years afterward, when the city was captured by Dost
Mohammed, says the city was largely a heap of rubbish, having
suffered the horrors of a long siege.
The city of Kabul, from which the surrounding territory of Eastern
Afghanistan takes its name, stands in lat. 34° 30' N., and long. 69°
6' E., near the point where the Kabul River is crossed by three
bridges. Its altitude is 6,400 feet, and, within a short distance to
the north, is overtopped by pinnacles of the Hindu Kush about 14,000
feet higher.
The winters are severe, but the summers are very temperate--seldom
going above 80°. Kabul is fortified without and within; being
separated into quarters by stone walls: the Bala Hissar, or citadel
proper, being on the east, while the Persian quarter of the city is
strongly protected on the southwest. In the days of Sultan Baber,
Kabul was the capital of the Mogul empire. In modern times, it has
been the scene of many Anglo-Indian struggles. It was taken by the
British in 1839, and lost by them, through treachery, in 1841;
in the following January, 4,000 British soldiers and 12,000
camp-followers were massacred while retreating.
Kandahar, the capital of Central Afghanistan, is about two hundred
miles S. W. of Kabul, and three hundred and seventy-one miles E. of
Herat. It is said to have been founded by Alexander of Macedon. The
city is laid out at right angles, and is watered from the
neighboring rivers through canals, which send to every street an
ample supply. Sir Michael Biddulph describes the surroundings:
"Kandahar stands on the western side of a plain, which was
originally a barren skirt of the mountain. Exactly opposite to the
city, and two miles to the westward, there is a wide break in the
dividing ridge, through which the road to Herat leads, and by which
are conducted the many canals and watercourses, taken from the
Argandab, to supply the town and fertilize its environs. The energy
and skill displayed in these extensive water-works cannot be too
highly extolled. Brought from a point many miles distant in the
Argandab valley, the chief canal, with its offshoots, conducts a
vast body of water, which is dispersed along the contours of the
declining plain in innumerable channels, spreading a rich fertility
for many miles in a fan-like form to the southeast of the gap.
Villages cluster around the city on three sides; cornfields,
orchards, gardens, and vineyards are seen in luxurious succession,
presenting a veritable oasis within the girdle of rugged hills and
desert wastes all around. And if we turn to the aspect of the
country beyond the gap, we see in the Argandab valley, along the
canals and the river banks, a fair and beautiful landscape of
village and cultivated ground, stretching for many miles in each
direction. This productive character of the immediate neighborhood
of Kandahar, and its commanding position within reach of other
fertile districts, would give to this place, under a strong, stable,
and just government, as much prosperity and happiness as falls to
the lot of any place in the world."
Jelalabad stands on the Kabul River, about half-way between Kabul
and the Khaiber Pass. It was the scene of the stubborn defence by
Sir Robert Sale in 1842, referred to elsewhere. It has a floating
population of about three thousand souls. Our engraving is taken
from the south and west. The stream in the west is the Kabul River.
The Jati gate in the south wall is the exit from the Hindu quarter.
The Kabul exit is on the west, while the road to Peshawur commences
at the gate of that name on the east wall of the city. The northern
gate is known as the Pheel Khana, or elephant quarter. The walls of
the town and of its houses are of mud, and the roofs generally of
wood. The city is laid out in the form of a parallelogram
intersected by two main streets crossing in the centre.
The town of Ghazni (the ancient Ghizni) is another historical
landmark in a region famous for its evidences of former grandeur. It
stands about 230 miles northeast of Kandahar on the road to Kabul;
it is literally "founded upon a rock" at an elevation of 7,726 feet,
and its base is 280 feet above the adjacent plain. It has walls
thirty-five feet high, and a wet ditch, but is not considered in any
sense formidable by modern engineers, as it is commanded by
neighboring heights; it will always be a rendezvous for the natives,
and forms a station or an important line of communication between
the Indus and the Murghab. In the tenth century it was the seat of
an empire comprising the present territory of Afghanistan, and which
had in the space of seventy years absorbed thirty-eight degrees of
longitude and twenty degrees of latitude. Its decline dates from the
twelfth century, when the seat of government was transferred to
Lahore. From 1839 to 1880 it has been occupied alternately by the
British and the Afghans. The climate is not exceptionally severe,
although in winter the mercury drops to 25° below zero at times. The
population averages about ten thousand.
Peshawur is one of the most important towns, both in a military and
commercial sense, in the Derajat. It is the capital of a
province of the same name on the N. W. frontier of India, eighteen
miles from the Khaiber Pass and one hundred and fifty miles S.E. of
Kabul. It has the usual bastioned defences, besides some detached
works of more importance. It was once a rich and populous city, but
has, like many other like places in that region, fallen from its
high estate. It is garrisoned by the British, and can boast of fair
trade and a population of about fifty thousand. It is the centre of
a fruitful district containing more than one million inhabitants.
The fruitful valley and pass of Bamian lie on the road leading from
Kabul to Turkestan. The pass, at an elevation of 8,496 feet, is the
only known defile over the Hindu Kush practicable for artillery.
This valley was one of the chief centres of Buddhist worship, as
gigantic idols, mutilated indeed by fanatical Mussulmans,
conclusively prove. Bamian, with its colossal statues cut out in the
rock, was among the wonders described by the Buddhist monks who
traversed Central Asia in the fourth century. The statues are found
on a hill about three hundred feet high, in which are a number of
cells excavated in the rock, not unlike those found in the Zuni
country in the western part of the United States. The male figure is
about 160 feet, the female 120 feet, in height; they are clothed in
light drapery, and a winding stair may be ascended to the head.
Eight miles eastward of Bamian lies the ancient fortress of Zohâk,
attributed to the fabulous Persian serpent-king of that name. It is
still used as one of the defences of the pass.
The animals of Afghanistan adapted to military transport purposes
are the camel, the yabu (mountain pony), and the donkey.
From certain professional papers, on the camel, by Captain Yaldwyn
and other officers of the Indian Army, we learn that this beast of
burden has been often utilized by the British in Afghanistan, and
the supply of camels raised in that country has generally been
augmented by drafts from India, although the last mentioned do not
thrive under the transition. The camel is docile, capable of
abstinence in an emergency, well adapted for the imposition of loads
and for traversing over flat or sandy ground, adapts itself to rough
roads, has acute sight and smell, and, during progression, moves
both feet on one side, simultaneously. Its flesh and milk are
wholesome articles of food. It is deficient in muscular power
behind, and cannot readily climb hills. Those found in Afghanistan
are of the Arabian species. They are strong, thickset, with
abundance of hair; are short in the leg, better climbers, and more
accustomed to cold than others of the species. Their feeding
requires as much care as that of cavalry or artillery horses; they
are fond of green food, and certain trees and shrubs. In grazing,
camels brought from India sometimes are poisoned by eating the
oleander bush and other plants which the native camel avoids.
Elphinstone's ill-fated expedition in 1841 lost 800 out of 2,500
camels from this cause alone. On the march, or where grazing does
not abound, they are fed with grain and bhoosa [Footnote:
Chopped straw.]; this is given them in one ration at the end of the
day. The theory that camels do not require much watering is declared
a fallacy; the Arabian species can take in five or six gallons,
sufficient for as many days; they will not drink cold running water;
but, where water can be had, they should be watered daily. The load
of the camel varies from 300 to 450 pounds, depending upon its
condition. It is admirably adapted for carrying long articles, as
ladders, tent-poles, and even light mountain guns. The marching
power of camels depends on a number of conditions. They are good
goers in loose sandy soil, and even over stony ground, if the stones
are not too large and sharp; in slippery places they are useless, as
they have no hold with their feet. They are very enduring, making
the longest marches at an average speed of two miles an hour, and
can ford deep rivers with ease if the current is not too rapid. When
the bottom of the ford is shifting sand, the passage of a number of
camels renders it firm. A string of 500 camels covers about one mile
of road; 1,250 mules, carrying the same weight of supplies, occupy
double the distance. Camels must be unladen at ferries. For military
purposes these animals are purchased between the ages of five and
nine years, and may be used up to the age of sixteen. They average
about one thousand pounds in weight, seven feet in height to the top
of the hump, and eight feet in length from nose to tail. In camp and
when not at work they are arranged in lines facing each other, or in
circles heads inward; the latter plan is the favorite formation at
night. The allowance of spare camels on service is ten per cent.
Lieut. Martin, R. E., states that his company, of Sappers and
Miners, was able to get an exceptional percentage of labor from
the camels under his charge by attention to certain details; and
says further, that "camels are very quarrelsome and bite each other
badly when grazing. They can ford four feet of moderately running
water, easily, if the bed is good; but a yard of greasy mud, a few
inches deep, will throw many camels and delay a convoy for hours.
Camel-bridges were carried on the leading camels, with a few
shovels and picks, in every convoy of the Kandahar Field Force, and
all small cuts or obstructions were thus bridged in a few minutes;
the camels remaining by their bridges (two gang-boards eight by
three feet) until the last baggage camel had passed. In perfectly
open country, such as Kandahar to Girishk, it was found possible to
march the camels on a broad front, the whole convoy being a rough
square; camels starting at 3 A.M. have been known to arrive at camp
ten miles off as late as 5 P.M."
Captain Yaldwyn says: "A camel's carrying-power is equal to that of
two and a half mules or ponies, whilst his ration is only about that
of one mule or pony. Thus 500 camels only eat as much as 500 mules
or ponies, and whilst the latter can only carry 1,000 maunds
[Footnote: A maund is 80 pounds.] the former can carry 2,500.
Again, 500 camels only require 125 attendants to be paid, clothed,
and fed, whilst 500 mules or ponies require 167 attendants." But, on
the other hand, the immense losses of camels from excessive heat or
cold, or over-exertion in mountainous or rough roads, and other
causes, greatly neutralize the force of this comparison.
The yabu is a hardy mountain pony used by the Afghans for
the saddle and packing purposes; they are very strong, active, and
sure-footed, and have been frequently used by the British forces in
their military operations. In 1839 Captain (afterward General)
Outram relates that his yabu, "although but thirteen hands
high, carried me and my saddlebags, weighing altogether upward of
sixteen stone, the whole distance from Kalát in seven days and a
half (an average of nearly forty-seven miles a day), during which
time I had passed 111 hours on its back; there was no saddle on the
pony, merely a cloth over his back."
They will carry from four to five maunds with perfect ease,
making journeys of thirty miles a day. Those which are ridden and
which amble, are called yurgas. The Afghans tie a knot in the
middle of the long tails of their horses, which, they say,
strengthens the animal's backbone!
The Afghan donkey was severely tested in 1880 during the operations
of Sir Donald Stewart between Kabul and Kandahar, and this class of
carriage was found very useful in the conveyance of provisions.
Afghan donkeys will march with troops and carry loads of grain or
flour, averaging ninety pounds, without difficulty. They keep pace
with mules or ponies in a baggage column, as they avoid the frequent
checks which retard the larger animals; they browse on the line of
march, and find their own forage easily in the neighborhood of camp;
they are easily controlled and cared for, and are on all accounts
the most inexpensive transport in Eastern countries. [Footnote:
Lieut.-Col. E. F. Chapman, C.B., R.A.]
The transport animals found in India and Turkestan will be described
in the parts of this book devoted to the military resources of those
regions.
In concluding this sketch of the "Threshold of India," a mere glance
at the military history of the country will suffice. In fact, only
so far as it may have a bearing upon the present, has reference to
the past any place in this volume.
The early periods of eventful interest to Afghanistan have been
already noted at the opening of this chapter. Its purely Oriental
experiences were beginning to fade with the death of Nadir Shah--
variously termed the "Butcher of Delhi," and the "Wallace of
Persia," in 1747. His progress toward India, from which he was to
tear its choicest treasure and loot its greatest city, reminds one
of the Arabian Nights. A camp-follower from Jelalabad reported as
follows: "He has 36,000 horsemen with himself * * * After morning
prayers he sits on a throne, the canopy of which is in the form of a
dome and of gold. One thousand young men, with royal standards of
red silk and the lance tops and tassels of silver, are disposed
regularly; and, at a proper distance, five hundred beautiful slaves,
from twelve to twenty years old, stand--one half on his right and
the other on his left. All the great men stand fronting him; and the
Arzbégi stands between, in readiness to represent whatever he is
desired, and everybody has his cause decided at once: bribery is not
so much as known here. He has particular information given him of
every thing that passes; all criminals, great and small, rich and
poor, meet with immediate death. He sits till noon, after which he
dines, then reposes a little; when afternoon prayers are over he
sits till the evening prayers, and when they are over he shoots five
arrows into the Khak Túdah, and then goes into the women's
apartments." [Footnote: Fraser's "Nadir Shah."]
The splendor of the Robber King has departed, but his deeds of blood
and treachery have often been repeated in the country of the
Afghans.
A succession of struggles between Afghan and Persian leaders for the
control of Afghanistan marked the next fifty years.
When the project of Russian invasion of India, suggested by
Napoleon, was under consideration in Persia, a British envoy was
sent, in 1809, to the then Shah Sujah, and received the most cordial
reception at Peshawur. But Shah Sujah was, in 1810, superseded by
his brother, Mahmud, and the latter was pressed hard by the son of
his Wazir to such an extent that Herat alone remained to him. In
1823 his former kingdom passed to Dost Mohammed, who in 1826
governed Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Peshawur. The last-named place
fell into the hands of Runjeet Singh, the "Lion of the Punjab." Dost
Mohammed then applied to England for aid in recovering Peshawur,
failing in which he threatened to turn to Russia.
That Power was (1837) engaged in fomenting trouble in the western
part of Afghanistan, encouraging an attack by 30,000 Persians, led
by Russian officers, upon Herat. Instead of acceding to the request
of Dost Mohammed, the British Governor-General--Lord Auckland--
declared war against that potentate, alleging in a proclamation that
"the welfare of the English possessions in the East rendered it
necessary to have an ally on their western frontier who would be in
favor of peace, and opposed to all disorders and innovations."
This was the beginning of intrigues relating to Afghanistan on the
part, alternately, of England and Russia, in which John Bull has had
to pay, literally, "the lion's share" of the cost in blood and
treasure. In 1850, Sir John Cam Hobhouse, President of the Board of
Control in India confessed: "The Afghan war was done by
myself; the Court of Directors had nothing to do with it." The
reason already mentioned was alleged as an excuse for hostilities.
They were declared, notwithstanding that the British political agent
at the Court of Dost Mohammed reported that ruler as "entirely
English" in his sympathies. This report was suppressed. Twenty years
later the facts were given to Parliament, Russian letters were found
implicating the Czar's ministers, and the English agent, Burnes, was
vindicated.
The Anglo-Indian army--consisting of twenty thousand troops, fifty
thousand followers, and sixty thousand camels--advanced in two
columns, one from Bengal, and the other from Bombay by the Indus.
Scinde, which had hitherto been independent, like the Punjab and
Lahore, was subjugated en route, and nine thousand men were
left behind to occupy it. On the 23d of February, 1839, a
simultaneous advance from Shikarpur, on the Bolan Pass, commenced.
Kandahar was occupied April 25th, Ghazni July 23d, and Kabul August
6th, and Shah Sujah was proclaimed Ameer by British authority. By
the following September the greater part of the English forces
returned to India. Only five regiments of infantry and one of
cavalry remained in Afghanistan, where suspicious symptoms of
discontent with the new order of things began very soon to show
themselves. During the summer of 1840 insurrections had to be put
down by force in several places. In November of the same year Dost
Mohammed defeated the English in the Perwan Pass. From that time
until the autumn of 1841 a sultry calm reigned in the country.
The English commanders, although fully aware of the state of mind of
the people, neglected to take the most simple measures of
precaution.
The local control was vested in a mixed military and civil council,
consisting of General Elphinstone, unfitted by disease and natural
irresolution from exercising the functions of command, and Sir
William McNaghten, the British envoy, whose self-confidence and
trust in the treacherous natives made him an easy victim. In the
centre of an insurrection which was extending day by day under their
eyes and under their own roofs, these representatives of a powerful
nation, with a small but effective force, deliberately buried their
heads in the sand of their credulity, not realizing the nature of
the danger which for weeks was evident to many of their
subordinates.
Finally a force of the insurgents, under the direction of the son of
the deposed ruler, Akbar Khan, threw off the disguise they had
assumed before the English, and taking possession of the Khurd Kabul
Pass near the city, entirely cut off the retreat to India which
Elphinstone had commenced.
As there was no intelligent concert of action among the British
leaders, the garrison melted away in detail, the Afghan auxiliaries
refused to fight, or turned their arms against the Europeans. Sir
William McNaghten was murdered by Akbar, at a council in sight of
the garrison. A few attempts to force a passage, or to defend
themselves, made by certain brave officers of the beleagured force,
failed.
On January 6, 1842, an agreement was made by which the Afghan leader
promised to ensure to the British forces a safe withdrawal to India.
This was violated with Afghan readiness, and the entire Anglo-Indian
contingent of seventeen thousand souls was destroyed; sacrificed to
the murderous brutality of the Afghan insurgents, or dying from
exposure to one of the most severe winters known to that region.
Months after, heaps of dead bodies, preserved by the intense cold,
obstructed the mountain passes. The horrors of Moscow were repeated
in the Khurd Kabul, and the noblest attributes of humanity were
exemplified in the acts of the officers and soldiers of the doomed
party. Only twenty of this entire force survived. The news of this
horrible disaster was brought to Jelalabad by the only man who
penetrated the Afghan environment, Dr. Brydon.
On receipt of the news of this overwhelming catastrophe, the Indian
Government endeavored to rescue the garrisons of Kandahar and
Ghazni, as well as that of Jelalabad; but the Mohammedan troops
refused to march against their co-religionists, and the Sikhs also
showed great unwillingness. The garrison of Ghazni, thinking to
secure its safety by capitulation, was cut to pieces December 23,
1841. Jelalabad, held by 2,400 men under General Sale, still
withstood the storm like a rock of iron. General Nott, the energetic
officer commanding at Kandahar, on receiving the news of the
destruction of the British, blew up the citadel of the town,
destroyed every thing not necessary to his object, and started,
August 8, 1842, for Ghazni, which he also destroyed, September 6th.
Another British force of twelve thousand men, under General Pollock,
was organized at Peshawur, to punish the Afghans, and, so far as
might be, retrieve the errors of Elphinstone and McNaghten.
Pollock's operations were, in the sense of retaliation, successful.
An eminent German authority wrote: "Kabul and other towns were
levelled with the ground; Akbar's troops were blown from guns, and
the people were collected together and destroyed like worms."
General Pollock carried the famous Khaiber Pass, in advancing to the
relief of Jelalabad in April, 1842. This was the first time that the
great defile--twenty-eight miles in length--had ever been forced by
arms. Timur Lang and Nadir Shah, at the head of their enormous
hosts, bought a safe passage through it from the Afridis. Akbar the
Great, in 1587, is said to have lost forty thousand men in
attempting to force it, and Aurangzeb failed to get through.
The misfortune of Elphinstone's command, great as it was, would have
been much more humiliating to England, had it not been for the
firmness of the gallant General Pollock, who, ordered to withdraw
with his command to Peshawur, by Lord Ellenborough, without
effecting one of the objects of the expedition--the deliverance of
the English captives in Akbar's hands at Kabul,--protested against
such a suicidal act on the part of any Englishman or any
Administration, and, at great personal risk, gained his point.
In the forced march to Kabul, which Pollock made subsequently, the
force of about eight thousand men moved in as light order as
possible. After loading the commissariat camels to their utmost
carrying capacity, the General discovered that the mounted men had
in their kit a spare pair of pantaloons apiece, on which he ordered
the legs to be filled with grain and carried by the men in front of
them, on their saddles. By the middle of December the British had
started on their return march, pursued as far as the Indus by the
Afghans, and by this hurried conclusion to the war lessened their
prestige in Asia to an enormous degree.
As Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote:
"It was not so much the fact of our retreat; disaster would have
been diminished, if not altogether overcome; but retreating as we
did, pursued even through the last pass into the plains by an
implacable enemy, the impression became universal in India as well
as in Central Asia, that we had simply been driven back across the
mountains."
A very able Hindu gentleman, very loyal to the British, traced the
mutiny of 1857 in a great measure to the Afghan campaign of 1842. He
said: "It was a direct breach of faith to take the Sepoys out of
India. Practically they were compelled to go for fear of being
treated as mutineers, but the double pay they received by no means
compensated them for losing caste. The Sepoys mistrusted the
Government from that time forward, and were always fearing that
their caste would be destroyed; besides, the Kabul disaster taught
them that Europeans were not invincible."
The departure of the English forces was followed by the
reestablishment of Dost Mohammed's authority in Afghanistan. Once,
at the time of the Sikh insurrection, the Dost crossed the Indian
border with two thousand horsemen, and narrowly escaped falling into
the hands of the British in the affair of Gujrat, February 21, 1849,
where the speed of his horse alone saved him from capture. In 1855 a
better understanding was effected between the son of Dost Mohammed
and his powerful European neighbor. He reconquered Balkh in 1850,
and gained Kandahar by inheritance in 1855, while he lost Herat to
the Persians in 1856. With the aid of Great Britain, in 1857, Persia
relinquished all claims to Herat, but the Dost had eventually to
besiege that city, occupied by a rebellious faction, in 1863, and
after a siege of ten months reduced the place, only to find a tomb
within its walls. After the usual struggle for the throne, peculiar
to a change of dynasty in Afghanistan, Shere Ali, one of the Dost's
sons, prevailed, and was recognized in 1868. The next decade was
notable for a series of diplomatic manoeuvres between England and
Russia for Afghan friendship. Shere Ali now leaned toward the Lion,
now in the direction of the Bear, with the regularity of a pendulum.
The advances were received with presents and promises on the one
hand, and promises, powerful embassies, and imposing military
expeditions on the other. On September 21, 1878, a British
ambassador was turned back by the Afghan commandant of the frontier
fort of Ali Musjid, and on the 20th of November, of the same year,
war was declared against Shere Ali by the Anglo-Indian Government.
At that time the Russian General Kaufmann was operating on the
northern border of Afghanistan with a force of fifteen thousand men
and sixty guns, and the Ameer had reason to think that he could rely
on Russian coöperation against the English, who, with a force of
forty thousand men, promptly invaded his dominion.
This force moved into Afghanistan in four columns, under the
command, respectively, of Generals Browne, Roberts, Biddulph, and
Stewart, with reserves under Generals Maude and Primrose.
We shall have occasion later to consider some of the details of the
protracted operations which followed. They embraced several
admirably conducted marches, exposure to excessively severe winter
weather, the successful surmounting of great natural obstacles, the
development of the usual weakness in the department of transport,
with unnecessary losses in animals, a considerable sick-list, and an
inconsiderable proportion of killed and wounded in action.
The military benefits were those resulting from a long and arduous
field experience in a rough country. The interruption to these
actual "field manoeuvres," this "fire-drill," by the enemy, was
comparatively feeble,--as a rule, stimulating the Anglo-Indian force
to put its best foot foremost. Under this system, at the end of the
two years' campaign, all departments of the army had become moulded
into the efficient machines essential to success in any military
venture.
Politically, the campaign had been a failure. The fate of the
gallant Major Cavagnari and his mission, murdered at Kabul,
September 3, 1879, made a deeper impression on the Afghan mind than
the British occupation of Afghan cities or the Afghan losses in
battle.
In the same year the British Secretary for India, in London, wrote
to the Governor-General that: "It appears that as the result of two
successful campaigns, of the employment of an immense force, and of
the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been
accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was
desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption of
fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces,
and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country."
Early in the year 1880, the British Government prepared to make a
dignified withdrawal from Afghanistan. That volcanic region was by
no means tranquil, although the chief rebel, Yakoub Khan, had been
driven out of Kabul by General Roberts, and had retired to the
distant country of the Her-i-rúd. At this time appeared the
exiled Abdurrahman Khan, who had long resided at Tashkend, and who
was welcomed warmly by the local sirdars on the northern frontier of
Afghanistan. As he approached Kabul his authority and influence
increased, and the British political officers, acting under
instructions, formally recognized him as Ameer of that district. In
the meanwhile Yakoub advanced westward from Herat with a strong
force, encountered a British brigade, under General Burrows, near
the Helmund, and utterly routed it. The remnant of the European
force took refuge in Kandahar, where General Primrose was in
command. Surrounding the city, Yakoub succeeded in effectually
"bottling up" the British garrison for some time. Sir Frederick
Roberts, however, made a rapid march from Kabul on Kandahar, and
after a successful and decisive battle with the Afghans, completely
dispersed the native force, and relieved the beleaguered garrison.
Soon after, Abdurrahman was formally installed as Ameer of
Afghanistan, and the British army withdrew from the country.
III.
THE BRITISH FORCES AND ROUTES.
A sketch of the military resources of Great Britain, more especially
those available for field service in Afghanistan, with notes upon
the strength and composition of the forces, means of transport and
supply, nature of important lines of communication, and of certain
strategic points in the probable theatre of operations, will be
attempted in this chapter.
Organization.--The military system of Great Britain is based
upon voluntary enlistment instead of the usual European plan of
universal liability to service. Recruits may enlist either for the
"short-service" or "long-service" term; the first being for six
years in the ranks and six on furlough, and the last for twelve
years in the ranks; the furlough of short-service men is passed in
the army reserve, and then, in consideration of liability to be
recalled to the colors, the men are paid sixpence a day.
The troops of the Standing Army, (United Kingdom,) March, 1885, were
proportionately distributed as follows: forty-three per cent. in
England, two per cent. in Scotland, twenty-five per cent. in
Ireland, and thirty-five per cent. abroad, not including India.
AVAILABLE BRITISH LAND FORCES.
[Footnote: Approximately, from late returns (1885), but short of
authorized "establishment" by 90,000.]
ENGLAND.
==================================================================
Army Army Militia Yeomanry Volunteers
Reserve
==================================================================
Class:
Engineers
Officers 423
Men 4,762
Cavalry
Officers 559
Men 11,840 11,441
Royal Horse Artillery
Officers 108
Men 2,426
Royal Artillery
Officers 690
Men 18,351
Infantry
Officers 2,862
Men 80,324
Aggregate ------- ------ ------- ------ -------
All Ranks 122,345 44,503 108,462 11,441 209,365
==================================================================
Grand
Aggregate 469,116
==================================================================
INDIA. [Native Contingents, Independent States of India, [2]
about 349,831.]
==================================================================
Army (E'r'p'n) (Native)
==================================================================
Engineers
Officers 436
Men [3] 232 3,109
Cavalry
Officers 198 304
Men 4,086 18,071
Royal Horse Artillery
Officers
Men
Royal Artillery
Officers 453 19
Men 10,809 1,842
Infantry
Officers 1,400 1,068
Men 44,106 102,648
------- -------
Aggregate
All Ranks 61,488 127,263
=================================================================
Grand
Aggregate 188,751
=================================================================
[Footnote 2: Cashmere 27,000, Nepaul 100,000, Hyderabad 44,000.]
[Footnote 3: Sappers and Miners.]
For purposes of administration, instruction, and mobilization, Great
Britain and Ireland are partitioned into thirteen military districts
commanded by general officers. These are sub-divided as follows: for
the infantry one hundred and two sub-districts under regimental
commanders; for the artillery there are twelve sub-districts,
and for the cavalry two districts. The brigade of an infantry
sub-district comprises usually two line battalions, two militia
battalions, the brigade depôt, rifle volunteer corps, and infantry
of the army reserve. Of the line battalions one is generally at home
and one abroad. In an artillery sub-district are comprised a
proportion of the royal artillery and artillery of the militia,
volunteers, and army reserve respectively. In like manner a cavalry
sub-district includes the yeomanry and army reserve cavalry.
The officers on duty in the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster's
departments of the British army are, as a rule, detailed for a term
of five years from the Line, but must rejoin their regiments
immediately upon orders for foreign service.
The Royal Engineers then were and are organized into forty-three
companies.
The cavalry is divided into the Household Cavalry and Cavalry of the
Line. The first named comprises the 1st and 2d Life Guards and Royal
Horse Guards,--three regiments. The Line is composed of twenty-eight
regiments, as follows: seven of dragoon guards, three of dragoons,
thirteen of hussars, five of lancers. The strength of regiments
varies from 450 to 625 men with from 300 to 400 troop horses each.
The artillery--under the title of the Royal Regiment of Artillery--
is divided into three classes; the Royal Horse Artillery of two
brigades of twelve batteries each, making a brigade total of sixty
guns; the Field Artillery of four, brigades of seventy-six
batteries, and the Garrison Artillery of eleven brigades. For the
non-professional reader it may be well to say that, in the horse
artillery, all the personnel of a battery is mounted, the
better to act with cavalry or mounted infantry; under the general
term "field artillery" may be classed mountain batteries (only
maintained in India), field batteries proper, in which the guns are
somewhat heavier, and served by gunners who are not mounted, but on
occasion are carried on the limbers and on seats attached to the
axles, and in an emergency may be carried on the "off" horses of
teams. Under the class "field artillery," also, would come such
large guns as are required in war for siege or other heavy
operations, and which in India or Afghanistan would be drawn by
bullocks.
The infantry is composed of the Guards, the Line, and the Rifles.
The Guards consist of three regiments--Grenadier Guards, Coldstream
Guards, and Scots Fusilier Guards; in all seven battalions. The Line
comprises 102 regiments (204 battalions); the Rifles four
battalions. Besides these there are two regiments of Colonial (West
India) colored troops.
The Militia is intended for local defence, but can be ordered
anywhere within the United Kingdom, and is available for garrison
duty in the Mediterranean. Enlistment in the militia is for six
years. The officers are commissioned by the Queen, and, as before
noted, all the details of control and recruitment are entrusted to
district commanders. For instruction this force may be called out,
for a period not to exceed eight weeks annually, with regular
officers as instructors. There are 212 battalions of infantry, 25
brigades of garrison artillery, and 3 regiments of engineers
comprised in this force.
The Militia Reserve, limited to one fourth of the active militia, is
liable to army service in case of an emergency, and for the term of
six years is entitled to Ł1 per annum.
The Volunteers represent "the bulwark" in case of invasion; they are
organized principally as garrison artillery and infantry. The
officers are commissioned by the county lieutenants, subject to the
approval of the Queen. The men are recruited, armed, and instructed
by the Government. Recruits are required to attend thirty drills,
and afterward not less than nine drills annually. The volunteer
force is composed of 278 battalions of infantry, 46 brigades of
garrison artillery and 15 battalions of engineers.
The Yeomanry Cavalry are equipped as light cavalry, drill eight days
per year, and are subject to call in case of riot and insurrection,
when each man with a horse receives seven pence a day. There are
thirty-eight regiments.
The Army of India differs from that of the United Kingdom, not only
in its composition, but in the character of its organization. This
organization dates from 1858, when the government passed from the
East India Company to the Crown.
The European regiments serving in India are in all respects
organized and maintained, as in England. In each presidency forming
the three political subdivisions, and among which the Anglo-Indian
army is distributed, exists a staff corps which supplies all
European officers, permitted to serve with native troops. These
officers must pass certain examinations before they can be assigned
to any of the following vacancies in any native regiment.
INDIAN REGIMENT.
EUROPEANS
1 Commandant,
1 Second-in-command and wing officer,
1 Wing-officer,
2 Wing-subalterns,
1 Adjutant,
1 Quartermaster,
1 Medical officer.
NATIVES
2 Subadars (captains), 1st class,
2 " " 2d "
4 " " 3d "
4 Jemandars (lieuts.), 1st "
4 " " 2d "
1 Havildar (sergt.-major),
40 Havildars (sergeants),
40 Naicks (corporals),
16 Drummers,
600 Sepoys (privates).
The duties of the commandant of a native regiment correspond in
general to those of a similar officer in a European corps. Three
times a week he holds a "durbar," for the trial of offenders and
transaction of general regimental business. The men are paid by the
native officers in presence of the European "Wing-officer," who is
responsible for all public property issued to his half battalion, or
wing.
The native officers are commissioned by the Indian Government, and,
as a rule, are promoted from the ranks, and are of the same caste as
the privates. Certain native officers of the engineers and artillery
may be eligible to appointment in the corresponding European corps;
one is always assigned as an aide-de-camp to the Viceroy. When on
detailed service, a native officer is allowed to command his
company, but "no battalion parades should take place without the
presence of a British officer." [Footnote: Indian Army Regulations.]
In each regiment there is a drill-sergeant and drill-corporal, who
receive extra pay for their services. Corporals are promoted from
privates who know how to read and write in at least one character,
or who have displayed extraordinary courage. The pay per month of a
sepoy is equal to $3.50; havildar, $7; jemandar, $17.50; subadar,
$33.50 to $50. European officers with native regiments: commandant,
$620; wing-officers, $302 to $322; adjutant, $237.86; quartermaster,
$187.86; medical officers, $300, monthly. The annual pay-roll of a
native regiment of 720 combatants and 45 non-combatants amounts to
about $69,114. In consideration of the pay each sepoy is required to
provide his rations and clothing, except one coat and one pair of
trousers issued by the Government every two years; in consequence,
each regiment is accompanied by a native village called a bazaar,
containing tradesmen of all kinds; this bazaar is under strict
discipline and is managed by the quartermaster. The entire outfit
follows the regiment into the field.
Colonel Gordon of the Indian army testifies: "With regard to native
troops under a cannonade I may say that I saw our native infantry
twice under the fire of the Afghan mountain guns, and they behaved
very steadily and coolly. Ammunition was economically expended. I
attributed much the small loss sustained by the troops in
Afghanistan to our excellent straight shooting."
The cavalry of India has in certain instances borne an excellent
reputation for efficiency in action, is well set up, and in its
instruction and discipline is modelled after the British system. The
artillery comprises well-instructed native organizations, but its
principal experience has been with light field guns against
irregular troops. The Achilles heel of the Indian army consists in
this, that there are but eight European officers to each regiment,
and of these but six would be available to lead in battle: the
quartermaster and surgeon being at such a time otherwise engaged.
The native officers, seldom having an opportunity to command in
Peace, would be unreliable leaders in such an emergency. At the
action of Ali Musjid, November 21, 1878, the day before the
occupation of that fort, six British officers of a native battalion
were placed hors de combat, so that on the first day after
crossing the Afghan frontier there was but one European officer to
manage the regiment.
Besides the regular establishment there are about 10,000 European
volunteers (including 4,000 railway officials and employés)
available for local defence.
The feudatory chiefs of India enjoy an aggregate revenue of some
Ł15,000,000, equal to more than one third of the income of the
British Government of India. They maintain forces aggregating
350,000 men with 4,000 guns to perform the duties of court
ceremonial, garrison, military police, guards, and escorts,
throughout territories aggregating nearly 600,000 square miles with
50,000,000 of inhabitants. These forces are unreservedly held at the
disposal of the Crown by the native Princes.
Transport and Supply.--This essential feature of all wars
will be briefly considered in the light of the Anglo-Afghan War of
1879-80. Large quantities of supplies were transported from the main
base of operations on the Indus, and distributed to the troops in
the field over four or five distinct lines of communication, and
over roads, and mountain paths of varied degrees of ruggedness. The
country on both sides of the Indo-Afghan frontier was severely taxed
to furnish the necessary animals. Part of the transport was hired--
and as in the case of the Brahuis camels--with the services of the
owners, who were easily offended and likely to decamp with their
property in a night. During the first year the system was under the
direct control of the commissariat department; but as this proved
unsatisfactory, in the subsequent campaign it was entirely
reorganized and superintended by an officer of engineers, with a
large number of officers from the Line to assist. This gave better
satisfaction. Immense numbers of camels died from heat, [Footnote:
Of a train of eighteen hundred unloaded camels on the road from
Dadur to Jacobabad, for six days in June, six hundred died of
exhaustion. In March, 1855 Col. Green, C.B., lost one hundred and
seventeen horses out of four hundred, from the heat, during a march
of thirty miles.] overwork, irregular food, and neglect. Owing to
the dryness of the climate and intense heat of the summer the
bullock-carts were perpetually falling to pieces. The mules,
donkeys, and ponies gave the best results, but do not abound in
sufficient quantities to enable an army in Afghanistan to dispense
with camels. A successful experiment in rafting, from Jelalabad to
Dakka, was tried. The rafts consisted of inflated skins lashed
together with a light framework; between June 4-13, seven thousand
skins were used, and, in all, 885 soldiers and one thousand tons of
stores were transported forty miles down the Kabul River, the
journey taking five hours. A great deal of road-making and repairing
was done under the supervision of the transport corps. A system of
"stages" or relays of pack-animals or carts was organized, by which
a regular quantity of supplies was forwarded over the main lines,
daily, with almost the regularity, if not the speed, of rail
carriage. The great number of animals employed required a
corresponding force of attendants, inspectors, and native doctors,
all of whom served to make up that excessive army of "followers" for
which Anglo-Indian expeditions are famous. Drivers were required at
the following rate: one driver for each pair of bullocks, every four
camels, every three mules and ponies, every six donkeys. [Footnote:
The average carrying power of certain kinds of transport, in pounds,
is as follows: bullock-carts (with two pairs), on fairly
level ground, 1,400; on hilly ground, 1,000; (with one pair) on
fairly level ground, 850; on hilly ground, 650; camels, 400;
mules, 200; ponies, 175; men, 50.]
The great obstacle to the satisfactory operation of the transport
system was its novelty and experimental character, and that its
organization had to be combined with its execution. Besides which,
cholera broke out in June and swept away three hundred employés.
Grazing camps were established in the neighborhood of the Bolan Pass
for the bullocks, and aqueducts built for the conveyance of a water
supply; one of these was of masonry, more than a mile in length,
from Dozan down to the Bolan. It has been stated that grazing was
scarce in the region of the Bolan: in 1879 more than four thousand
bullocks were grazed there during the summer, and large quantities
of forage were cut for winter use.
Any prolonged military operations in Afghanistan must, to a certain
extent, utilize hired transport, although there are many objections
urged.
Sir Richard Temple said (1879): "That the amount of transport
required for active service, such as the late campaign in
Afghanistan, is so great that to hire transport is synonymous to
pressing it from the people of the district from which it is hired,
and impressment of the means of transport must lead to impressment
of drivers, who naturally (having no interest whatever in the
campaign in which they are called upon to serve) render the most
unwilling service and take the earliest opportunity of rendering
their animals unserviceable in hopes of escaping a distasteful duty.
This service is frequently so unpopular that, sooner than leave the
boundaries of their native country, the impressed drivers desert,
leaving their animals in the hands of the transport authorities or
take them away with them. * * * For the above reasons I should
recommend that all transport for a campaign should be the property
of Government."
In commenting on this subject, Lord Wolseley relates that when
serving in China with Indian troops he "awoke one morning and found
that all our drivers had bolted. Our transport consisted of carts
supplied by the Chinese Government, by contractors, and by the
country generally. I do not think that the carts had been carried
away, but all the mules and men had disappeared except three drivers
who belonged to me. I was very much astonished that these men had
not bolted also. I had a small detachment of cavalry with me and a
very excellent duffadar in charge of it. I asked him how he had
managed to keep these drivers--having some time before said that
unless he looked after them well he would never get to Pekin. He
replied, with some hesitation: 'I remember what you told me, and the
fact is I tied the tails of those three men together, overnight, and
then tied them to the tent pole, and put a man over them.'"
The Elephant, like the stage coach, finds his field of usefulness,
as a means of transport, growing smaller by degrees. He is still a
feature in India, and has been used for military purposes to some
extent in the eastern part of Afghanistan. He will doubtless form
part of the means of transportation employed by the British forces
near their present base, and in rear of the Kabul-Kandahar line, and
for that reason is noticed here. [Footnote: The use of elephants in
transporting field guns in Afghanistan is emphatically discouraged
by those who served with it last; very few flankers were employed to
protect the Elephant artillery used in the Kuram valley, and its
success can only be interpreted by supposing the direct
interposition of Providence or the grossest stupidity to our feeble
enemy.]
The Superintendent of the Government Elephant Kheddahs at Dakka has
given us, in a recent paper, much information concerning the
elephant in freedom and captivity. He does not claim a high order of
intelligence, but rather of extraordinary obedience and docility for
this animal Very large elephants are exceptional. Twice round the
forefoot gives the height at the shoulder; few females attain the
height of eight feet; "tuskers," or male elephants, vary from eight
to nine feet; the Maharajah of Nahur, Sirmoor, possesses one
standing ten feet five and one half inches. The age varies from 80
to 150 years, according to the best authorities, and it is recorded
that those familiar with the haunts of the wild elephant have never
found the bones of an elephant that had died a natural death. In
freedom they roam in herds of thirty to fifty, always led by a
female; mature about twenty-five. In India the males only have
tusks; in Ceylon only the females. They are fond of the water, swim
well, [Footnote: Elephants have been known to swim a river three
hundred yards wide with the hind legs tied together.] but can
neither trot nor gallop; their only pace is a walk, which may be
increased to a shuffle of fifteen miles an hour for a very
short distance; they cannot leap, and a ditch eight by eight feet
would be impassable.
In Bengal and Southern India elephants particularly abound, and seem
to be increasing in numbers. In the Billigurungan Hills, a range of
three hundred square miles on the borders of Mysore, they made their
appearance about eighty years ago; yet prior to that time this
region was under high cultivation, traces of orchards, orange
groves, and iron-smelting furnaces remaining in what is now a
howling wilderness. Elephants are caught in stockades or kraals. The
Government employs hunting parties of 350 natives trained to the
work, and more than 100 animals are sometimes secured in a single
drive.
New elephants are trained by first rubbing them down with bamboo
rods, and shouting at them, and by tying them with ropes; they are
taught to kneel by taking them into streams about five feet deep,
when the sun is hot, and prodding them on the back with sharp
sticks.
The total number of elephants maintained is eight hundred, of which
one half are used for military purposes. They consume about 400
pounds of green, or 250 pounds of dry fodder daily, and are also
given unhusked rice. An elephant is expected to carry about 1,200
pounds with ease. In the Abyssinian Expedition elephants travelled
many hundreds of miles, carrying from 1,500 to 1,800 pounds
(including their gear), but out of forty-four, five died from
exhaustion; they are capable of working from morning to night, or of
remaining under their loads for twenty hours at a stretch.
[Footnote: There is no "elephant gun-drill" laid down in the
Imperial Regulations, but when the gun goes into action the elephant
is made to kneel, and long "skids" are placed against the cradle
upon which the gun rests, so as to form an inclined plane to the
ground. The gun is then lifted off the cradle and down the skids by
levers and tackle.]
An elephant's gear consists of a gaddela, or quilted cloth,
1-1/2 inches thick, reaching half-way down his sides and from the
neck to the croup. On this is placed the guddu, or pad, 6x5
feet and 9 inches thick, formed of stout sacking stuffed with dried
grass. The whole is girthed with a long rope passed twice around the
body, round the neck as a breast-strap, and under the tail as a
crupper. The whole weighs 200 pounds. An improvement upon this has
been made by our authority (Mr. Sanderson), which seems to bear the
same relation to the old gear that the open McClellan saddle does to
the ordinary British hunting saddle. It consists (see illustration)
of two pads entirely detached, each 4 feet long, 15 inches wide,
and 6 inches thick, made of blanket covered with tarpaulin, and
encased in stout sacking. One is placed on each side of the
elephant's spine, and retained there by two iron arches. There is no
saddle-cloth, the load rests on the ribs; the breast-strap and
crupper hook into rings on the saddle; there are rings to fasten the
load to; it weighs 140 pounds. With foot-boards it is convenient for
riding; a cradle can also be attached for carrying field guns.
Recent experiments have shown the practicability of conveying
elephants by rail in ordinary open cattle-trucks; they were
indifferent to the motion, noises, or bridges; it is said that 32
elephants could be thus carried on one train.
The excellent railway facilities for moving troops and supplies to
the Indo-Afghan frontier were described in 1880, by Traffic Manager
Ross, of the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi Railway, before the United
Service Institution of India.
He stated that experiments had been made by the military and
railway authorities in loading and disembarking troops and war
matériel, and that much experience had been afforded by the
Afghan operations of 1878-9.
The movement of troops to and from the frontier commenced in
October, 1878, and ended June, 1879. During that period were
conveyed over his road 190,000 men, 33,000 animals, 500 guns,
112,000,000 pounds of military stores. The maximum number carried in
any one month was in November--40,000 men, 8,000 animals, and
20,800,000 pounds of stores. The greatest number of special trains
run in one day was eight, carrying 4,100 men, 300 animals, and
800,000 pounds of stores. As an instance of rapid loading, when the
both Bengal Cavalry left for Malta, 80 horses were loaded on a train
in 10 minutes appears to have been clean forgotten. The Politicals
were by no means silent, and the amount of knowledge they possessed
of border statistics was something marvellous. Did any step appear
to the military sense advisable, there was a much better, though
less comprehensible, political reason why it should not be
undertaken. The oracle has spoken and the behest must be obeyed. An
enemy in sight who became afterwards hostile, must not be kept at a
distance; through political glasses they appear as 'children of
nature,' while the country out of sight must not be explored, the
susceptibilities of the sensitive 'Tammizais' having to be
respected. That much valuable service was performed by political
officers there can be no doubt, but that they caused great
exasperation among soldiers cannot be denied, and the example of the
War of 1839-40 causes them to be looked upon as a very possible
source of danger.
Anglo-Afghan Operations.--The observations of a participant
[Footnote: Lieut. Martin, R. E. (Journal U. S. I. of India).]
in the last British campaign in Afghanistan will be found of value
in the study of future operations in that country. Of the Afghan
tactics he says: "The enemy (generally speaking, a race of
Highlanders) vastly preferred the attack, and usually obtained the
advantage of superior numbers before risking an attack; * * * being
able to dispense (for the time) with lines of communication and
baggage and commissariat columns, the Afghan tribes were often able
to raise large gatherings on chosen ground. They could always attack
us; we were rarely able (except when they chose) to find them at
home." This observer says the regular troops of the Ameer were
not so formidable as the tribal gatherings. The presence of a
tactically immovable artillery hinders the action of an Asiatic
army. The mounted men are usually the first to leave when the
fight is going against their side in a general engagement. One of
the best specimens of their tactics was at Ahmed-Kheyl, on the
Ghazni- Kandahar road, when the British division was one hundred
miles from any support. The Afghans assembled a force outnumbering
the British ten to one. The attack was made in a series of rushes,
twice dispersing the British cavalry, and once driving back the
infantry. Exposed to a constant fire of field guns, the Afghans
stood their ground, although poorly armed with a variety of obsolete
weapons-- from an Enfield to a handjar or a stick. Trouble may
always be expected from the night attacks of certain tribes like the
Alizais and Waziris.
The English infantry formation was an objectionably close one, and
Lieut. Martin says that the bayonets and rifle-barrels of the front
rank were sometimes struck and jammed by bullets from the rear
rank. The action of the English cavalry, as at Ahmed-Kheyl, was
suicidal in receiving the enemy's charge--practically at a halt.
Occasionally shelter trenches were used, but disapproved.
In the Kuram valley column, under General Roberts, the cavalry
(principally native, with one regular squadron and a battery of
horse artillery) formed a brigade, but was never used independently,
nor was it instructed (although well equipped) for modern cavalry
work. The opposition to dismounted cavalry duty is still so great,
in the British army, that the mounted arm is paralyzed for effective
service.
Very little was done by the horse artillery with the Kuram column.
In the case of the field artillery it was found necessary on two
occasions to transfer the ammunition boxes from the bullock-carts to
the backs of elephants, on account of the steepness of the hills.
The mountain artillery (native) was the most serviceable; a Gatling
battery, packed on ponies, and in charge of a detachment of
Highlanders, was never used however.
The armament of the infantry included both Martini and Snider
rifles, requiring two kinds of ammunition, but, as the service by
pack-mules was ample, no confusion ensued, although Lieut. Martin
says: "In one case I heard a whisper that a regimental reserve of
ammunition was found to be blank cartridges, but this must be
a heavy joke." Intrenching tools were carried on camels. A mixture
of military and civil-engineer administration and operation is
mentioned as unsatisfactory in results. There was great difficulty
in getting tools and materials at the opening of the campaign--
particularly those required for road and bridge work, although a
railroad within two hundred miles had a large stock on hand.
The art of camping and rough fortification was well practised. The
best defended camp was surrounded by bush abatis and flanked
by half-moon sungas of boulder-stone work, which held the
sentries. The most approved permanent camps or "posts" were
mud serais flanked by bastions at the alternate angles and
overlooking a yard or "kraal." These were established about ten
miles apart, to protect communications, and furnished frequent
patrols. During the latter part of the campaign these outposts were
manned by the native contingents of the Punjab who volunteered.
The rapid march of General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar in August,
1880, and the final dispersion of the forces of Ayoub Khan,
illustrated British operations in Afghanistan under the most
favorable circumstances. The forces included 2,800 European and
7,000 Indian troops; no wheeled artillery was taken; one regiment of
native infantry, trained to practical engineering work, did the work
of sappers and miners; for the transportation of sick and wounded
2,000 doolie-bearers, 286 ponies, and 43 donkeys; for transport of
supplies a pack-train of 1,589 yabus, 4,510 mules, 1,224 Indian
ponies, 912 donkeys--a total of 10,148 troops, 8,143 native
followers, and 11,224 animals, including cavalry horses; 30 days'
rations, of certain things, and dependence on the country for fresh
meat and forage. The absence of timber on this route rendered it
difficult to obtain fuel except by burning the roofs of the villages
and digging up the roots of "Southern-wood" for this purpose. The
manner of covering the movement rested with the cavalry commander.
Usually the front was covered by two regiments, one regiment on each
flank, at a mile from the column, detaching one or more troops as
rear-guard; once movement had commenced, the animals, moving at
different gaits were checked as little as possible. With such a
number of non-combatants the column was strung out for six or seven
miles, and the rear-guard leaving one camp at 7 A.M. rarely reached
the next--fifteen to twenty miles distant--before sundown.
Routes.--For operations in Afghanistan the general British
base is the frontier from Kurrachee to Peshawur. These points are
connected by a railway running east of the Indus, which forms a
natural boundary to the Indian frontier, supplemented by a line of
posts which are from north to south as follows: Jumrud, Baru,
Mackeson, Michni, Shub Kadar, Abazai, and Kohut; also by fortified
posts connected by military roads,--Thull, Bunnoo, and Doaba.
From the Indus valley into the interior of Afghanistan there are
only four lines of communication which can be called military
roads: first, from Peshawur through the Khaiber Pass to
Kabul; second, from Thull, over the Peiwar and
Shuturgurdan passes to Kabul; third, from Dera Ismail
Khan through the Guleir Surwandi and Sargo passes to
Ghazni; fourth, by Quetta to Kandahar and thence to
Herat, or by Ghazni to Kabul. Besides these there are
many steep, difficult, mule tracks over the bleak, barren, Sulimani
range, which on its eastern side is very precipitous and impassable
for any large body of troops.
The Peshawur-Kabul road, 170 miles long, was in 1880 improved and
put in good order. From Peshawur the road gradually rises, and after
7 miles reaches Jumrud (1,650 feet elevation), and 44 miles further
west passes through the great Khaiber Pass. This pass, 31 miles
long, can, however, be turned by going to the north through the
Absuna and Tartara passes; they are not practicable for wheels, and
the first part of the road along the Kabul River is very difficult
and narrow, being closed in by precipitous cliffs.
As far as Fort Ali Musjid the Khaiber is a narrow defile between
perpendicular slate rocks 1,460 feet high; beyond that fort the road
becomes still more difficult, and in some of the narrowest parts,
along the rocky beds of torrents, it is not more than 56 feet wide.
Five miles further it passes through the valley of Lalabeg 1-1/2
miles wide by 6 miles long, and then after rising for four miles it
reaches the top of the Pass, which from both sides offers very
strong strategical positions. From thence it descends for 2-1/2
miles to the village of Landi Khana (2,463 feet), which lies in a
gorge about a quarter of a mile wide; then on to Dakka (altitude
1,979 feet). This pass, 100 to 225 feet wide and 60 feet long, is
shut in by steep but not high slopes, overgrown with bushes.
On the eleven miles' march from Dakka to Hazarnao, the Khurd Khaiber
is passed, a deep ravine about one mile long, and in many places so
narrow that two horsemen cannot pass each other. Hazarnao is well
cultivated, and rich in fodder; 15 miles farther is Chardeh (1,800
feet altitude), from which the road passes through a well-cultivated
country, and on through the desert of Surkh Denkor (1,892 feet
altitude), which is over 8-1/2 miles from Jelalabad. From this city
(elsewhere described) onward as far as Gundamuck the route presents
no great difficulties; it passes through orchards, vineyards, and
cornfields to the Surkhab River; but beyond this three spurs of the
Safed Koh range, running in a northeastern direction, have to be
surmounted.
Between Jelalabad [Footnote: The heat at Jelalabad from the end of
April is tremendous--105° to 110° in the shade.] and Kabul two roads
can be followed: the first crosses the range over the Karkacha Pass
(7,925 feet alt.) at the right of which is Assin Kilo, thence
through the Kotul defile, and ascending the Khurd Kabul [Footnote:
The Khurd Kabul Pass is about five miles long, with an impetuous
mountain torrent which the road (1842) crossed twenty-eight times.]
(7,397 feet alt.) to the north reaches the high plateau on which
Kabul is situated; the other leads over the short but dangerous
Jagdallak Pass to Jagdallak, from which there are three roads to
Kabul--the northernmost over the Khinar and the third over the
Sokhta passes; all these, more difficult than the Khaiber, are
impassable during the winter. It was here, as already related, that
the greater part of Elphinstone's command, in 1842, perished. There
is a dearth of fuel and supplies by this line of communication. The
second, or Thull-Kuram-Kabul, route, was taken by General Roberts in
1878-9. It extends from Thull, one of the frontier posts already
mentioned, some forty miles into the Kuram valley, and then
inclining towards the west leads to the Kuram fort (Mohammed
Azim's), a walled quadrangular fortress with flanking towers at an
elevation of 6,000 feet. The Kuram valley is, up to this point, well
cultivated and productive; wood, water, and forage abound. Winter
only lasts with any severity for six weeks, and the Spring and
Autumn are delightful.
A short distance above the fort commences the ascent toward the
Peiwar Pass (8,000 feet alt.), twenty-four miles distant. The road,
thickly bordered with cedar and pine trees, is covered with boulders
and is very difficult, and from the village of Peiwar--one of
many en route, of the usual Afghan fortified type--it leads
through a winding defile to the top of the pass. Here the road is
confined by perpendicular chalk rocks, the summits of which are
covered with scrub timber and a luxurious growth of laurel. On the
farther side of the pass the road ascends to the height of the
Hazardarakht, (which is covered with snow in the winter), and then
climbs to the Shuturgurdan Pass (11,375 feet alt.), reaching a
plateau on which the snow lies for six months of the year; thence it
descends into the fertile Logar valley and reaches Akton Khel, which
is only fifty-one miles from Kabul. The total length of this route
is about 175 miles.
The third, or Dera-Ismail-Khan-Sargo-Ghazni, route passes through a
region less frequented than those mentioned, and is not thought
sufficiently difficult for detailed description. Passing due west,
through seventy miles of mountain gorges destitute of supplies or
forage, it debouches, through the Gomal Pass, into a more promising
country, in which forage may be obtained. At this point it branches
to Ghazni, Kandahar, and Pishin respectively. A road exists from
Mooltan, crossing the Indus at Dera-Ghazi-Khan, Mithunkot, Rajanpur,
Rojan, Lalgoshi, Dadur to Quetta, and was utilized by General
Biddulph, from whose account of his march from the Indus to the
Helmund, in 1879, is gleaned the following. The main point of
concentration for the British forces, either from India or from
England via Kurrachee is thus minutely described.
"The western frontier of India is, for a length of 600 miles,
bounded by Biluchistan and territories inhabited by Biluch tribes,
and for 300 miles Biluch country intervenes between our border and
Afghanistan. The plains of the Punjab and Sind run along the
boundary of Biluchistan, and at a distance of from 25 to 50 miles
the Indus pursues a course, as far down as Mithunkot, from north to
south, and then winds south-west through a country similar to that
of Egypt. A belt of cultivation and beyond that the desert * * *
this line of hills (the Eastern Sulimani) extends as a continuous
rampart with the plains running up to the foot of the range, and
having an elevation of 11,000 feet at the Tukl-i-Suliman, and of
7,400 near Fort Munro (opposite Dera-Ghazi-Khan), gradually
diminishes in height and dwindles away till it is lost in the plains
near Kusmore, at a point 12 miles from the Indus. The strip of
low-land country on the west bank of the Indus up to the foot of
the hills is called the Derajat. It is cut up and broken by
torrents, the beds of which are generally dry wastes, and the
country is, except at a few places where permanent water is found,
altogether sterile and hot. If we view the physical aspect looking
north and north-west from Jacobabad, we notice a wide bay of plains
extending between the broken spur of the Sulimani, and a second
range of hills having a direction parallel to the outer range. This
plain is called the Kachi, extends in an even surface for 150 miles
from the Indus at Sukkur, and is bounded on the north by successive
spurs lying between the two great ranges. The Kachi, thus bounded by
barren hills on all sides but the south, is one of the hottest
regions in the world. Except where subject to inundations or within
reach of irrigation it is completely sterile--a hard clay surface
called Pat,--and this kind of country extends around to the
east of the spur of the Suliman into the Derajat country. Subject to
terrific heats and to a fiercely hot pestilential wind, the Kachi is
at times fatal even to the natives."
The range of mountains bounding the Kachi to the westward is a
continuous wall with imperceptible breaks only, and it bears
the local names of Gindari, Takari, and Kirthar. Through this
uniform rampart there are two notable rents or defiles, viz.: the
Múlla opening opposite Gundana, leading to Kelat; and the
Bolan entering near Dadur, leading to Quetta, Kandahar, and
Herat. The Bolan is an abrupt defile--a rent in the range,--the
bottom filled with the pebbly bed of a mountain torrent. This steep
ramp forms for sixty miles the road from Dadur, elevation 750 feet,
to the Dasht-i-Bedowlat, elevation 6,225 feet. This inhospitable
plateau and the upper portion of the Bolan are subject to the most
piercingly cold winds and temperature; and the sudden change from
the heat of the Kachi to the cold above is most trying to the
strongest constitutions. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the
road, the absence of supplies and fuel, and the hostile character of
the predatory tribes around, this route has been always most in
favor as the great commercial and military communication from
Persia, Central Asia, and Khorassan to India.
The causes which led to the establishment of a British garrison at
Quetta are not unlike those which are urged as good Russian reasons
for the occupation of territory in certain parts of Central Asia.
Briefly stated, it seems that after the conquest of the Punjab, the
proximity of certain disturbed portions of Biluchistan, and the
annoyance suffered by various British military expeditions, in
1839-1874, from certain tribes of Biluchis--notably the Maris and
Bugtis,--made it desirable that more decisive measures should be
adopted. In 1876 a force of British troops was marched to Kelat, and
by mutual agreement with the Khan a political agency was established
at Quetta, ostensibly to protect an important commercial highway,
but at the same time securing a military footing of great value. But
the character of the lords of the soil--the Maris, for instance--has
not changed for the better, and the temporary general European
occupation of the country would afford an opportunity to gratify
their predatory instincts, which these bandits would not hesitate to
utilize. The Maris can put 2,000 men into the field and march 100
miles to make an attack. When they wish to start upon a raid they
collect their wise men together and tell the warriors where the
cattle and the corn are. If the reports of spies, sent forward,
confirm this statement, the march is undertaken. They ride upon
mares which make no noise; they travel only at night. They are the
most excellent outpost troops in the world. When they arrive at the
scene of action a perfect watch is kept and information by single
messengers is secretly sent back. Every thing being ready a rush of
horsemen takes place, the villages are surrounded, the cattle swept
away, the women and children hardly used--fortunate if they escape
with their lives. The villagers have their fortlets to retreat to,
and, if they reach them, can pull the ladders over after them and
fire away from their towers.
Dadur is an insignificant town at the foot of the Bolan. From here
the Kandahar road leads for sixty miles through the Pass--a gradual
ascent; in winter there is not a mouthful of food in the entire
length of the defile.
Quetta, compared with the region to the south, appears a very Garden
of Eden. It is a small oasis, green and well watered.
From Quetta to Pishin the road skirts the southern border of a vast
plain, interspersed with valleys, which extend across the eastern
portion of Afghanistan toward the Russian dominion. A study of the
Pishin country shows that it is, on its northwestern side supported
on a limb of the Western Sulimani. This spur, which defines the west
of the Barshor valley, is spread out into the broad plateau of Toba,
and is then produced as a continuous ridge, dividing Pishin from the
plains of Kadani, under the name of Khoja Amran. The Barshor is a
deep bay of the plain, and there is an open valley within the outer
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